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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY,
a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and ROBERT
GORLINSKI,
Defendants and Appellants,

Case No.
7825

CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
Cross-Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY,
a corporation, and UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
Cross-Defendants and Appellees

KEPLY BKIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANTS

I,
THE JONES PATENT DID NOT GRANT THE
ENTIRE CORA No. 1 LODE BUT SPECIFICALLY
EXCLUDED THE PART THEREOF CONTAINED
WITHIN THE CONFLICT AREA.
It is manifest that the critical issue in this case
involves the construction and interpretation of the Jones
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Patent. Defendants and Appellants in their opening
brief discussed this issue under Point III at pages 33,
et seq. Plaintiffs and Appellees set forth their position
in their brief under point A-7 at page 25, et seq. Counsel
for Plaintiffs and Appellees "skeletonize" the pertinent
language in the patent and seek to demonstrate that
the concluding clause of the exception, viz:
"and also that portion of said Cora No. 1 vein
or lode, and of all veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire depth, the tops or apexes of
which lie inside of such excluded ground"
operates as a grant rather than as an exclusion. Oppositely, Defendants and Appellants assert that this clause
when properly related to the other provisions of the
patent operates as an exclusion from the grant of that
portion of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode which is situate
in the conflict area.
There is no apex of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode
within the non-excluded ground of the description. The
testimony of the engineers and geologists, Hanson and
Christensen (who were plaintiff's experts), proves there
is no apex of the vein within such ground. The testimony
of Dr. Hanson on this point is set forth on pages 42 to
48 in Defendants' and Appellants' opening brief. Dr.
Christensen, at pages 53, 54, 55 and 56 of Defendants'
and Appellants' opening brief, clearly demonstrates that
this mineral deposit possesses no apex. The grant to
Jones therefore carried with it no extralateral rights.
The authorities cited in the opening brief of Defendants
and Appellants sustain the proposition that it is the
2
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existence of an apex within a granted area that carries
extralateral rights. If the apex of the vein is not within
the granted area the patentee acquires no title to the
deposit exterior to the side and end lines of the grant.
Therefore, Defendants and Appellants cannot rely upon
the doctrine of extralateral rights and it must be excluded
from consideration.
In construing and interpreting the exceptions and
exclusions in the Jones patent (the portion of the patent
in controversy is set forth at page 4 of Defendants' and
Appellants' opening brief and at pages 26 and 27 of the
brief of Plaintiffs and Appellees), consideration must
be given to several elements entering into the form of
the exception and exclusion clause.
1. The element of punctuation is an important
consideration.
The Cora No. 1 lode claim is specifically described
by metes and bounds. The description has eight courses
and eight corners. That portion of the Cora No. 1
embraced within Lot 48 or the Little Allie Claim and
that portion situate in the Southwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 32 (except Tract A, which
is described by metes and bounds) are obviously excluded
from the grant. Attention is invited to the placement
of a semi-colon following the terminal words of the
description of Tract A being the words "to the place of
beginning." According to Funk and Wagnall's standard
dictionary a semi-colon is "A mark of grammatical punctuation used in English to indicate a separation in the
relations of the thought a degree greater than that
3
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expressed by the comma." According to the same dictionary, a comma is "A rhetorical punctuation mark (,)
indicating the slightest possible separation in ideas and
construction." The draftsman excluded that part of Cora
No. 1 situate in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 32 and then from this exclusion
excepted Tract A describing it by metes and bounds and
then placed a semi-colon at the end of the description
of Tract A. He placed a semi-colon in the position indicated because he had completed the description of the
area which was excepted from the broad exclusion of
the area within the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 32. By the placement of a semi-colon
in this position he definitely indicated a separation of
thought. He had concluded his idea concerning the land
(which was Tract A) to be saved to the patentee from
the general exclusion. He was then prepared to go forward with another thought. He then introduced an idea
entirely alien to Tract A and there follows the clause
"and also that portion of said Cora No. 1 vein or lode,
and of all veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire
depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such
excluded ground." This thought certainly has no connection with the description of the land to be saved from
the general exclusion (Tract A) and the use of the semicolon was the proper metliod of indicating that the
draftsman was introducing a new thought which relates
back to the primary exclusion of the patent and refers
to the general exception and exclusion pertaining to Lot
48 and the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of Section 32. Read in this manner the patent excepts
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and excludes from the grant all that portion of the
ground of Cora No. 1 embraced in:
(a)

Lot 48 or Little Allie Claim, and

(b)

Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 32 except Tract A, and

(c)

All that portion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode
and of all veins, lodes and ledges, the tops
or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground.

2. The granting clause of the Jones patent
confirms Defendants' and Appellants' construction*
The granting clause of the Jones patent reads as
follows:
"Now know ye, that there is therefore, pursuant to the laws aforesaid, hereby granted by
the United States unto the said grantee and to
the heirs or successors and assigns of said
grantee, the said mining premises hereinbefore
described and not expressly accepted (excepted)
from these presents, and all that portion of the
said vein, lode or ledge, and all other veins, lodes
and ledges through their entire depth, the tops
or apexes of which lie inside of the surface
boundary lines of said granted premises in said
survey extending downward vertically, although
such veins, lodes or ledges to (in) their downward
course may so far depart from the perpendicular
as to extend outside the vertical side lines of said
premises * * *."
For convenience there is below shown in parallel
columns the relevant parts of the definitive description
of the patent and also of the granting clause thereof:
5
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GRANTING CLAUSE OF
JONES PATENT

DEFINITIVE DESCRIPTION

"and also all that portion
of said Cora No. 1 vein or
lode, and of all veins, lodes
and ledges, t h r o u g h o u t
their entire depth, the tops
or apexes of which lie
inside of such excluded
ground * * *." (Emphasis
supplied).
• - . ..

"the said mining premises
hereinbefore described and
not e x p r e s s l y accepted
(excepted) from these presents, and all that portion
of the said vein, lode or
ledge and all other veins,
lodes and ledges through
their entire depth, the tops
or apexes of which lie inside of the surface boundary lines of said granted
premises in said survey,
etc. * * *." (Emphasis supplied).

The provisions of the granting clause are consistent
with the requirements of R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30,
Section 26). There is a grant of extralateral rights based
on the statutory mandate. If the non-excluded area of
Cora No. 1 (delineated in blue on plat in opening brief
of Defendants and Appellants) had contained the apex
or top of the vein this grant would have carried with it
all "veins, lodes and ledges throughout their entire
depth'* * * although such veins, lodes and ledges may so
far depart from the perpendicular in their coarse downward as to extend outside the vertical sidelines of such
surface locations." Stated otherwise, if said non-excluded
area contained the apex of a vein the grantee would be
entitled to follow the vein on its dip although it extended
t>
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outside the vertical sidelines of the survey location.
(R.S. 2322 is set forth verbatim on pages 62 and 63 of
opening brief of Defendants and Appellants).
When the granting clause is compared with the
definitive description of the patent an anomalous situation is provoked if the interpretation and construction
of the definitive description advocated by Plaintiffs and
Appellees is adopted. As has been demonstrated the
granting clause conveyed all that portion of the veins
which may have their apexes within the non-excluded
area and according to Plaintiffs and Appellees it also
conveyed the portion of Cora No. 1 vein and of all veins
the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded
ground. The result of this construction is that Jones
was granted not only the portions of veins or lodes having
their apexes in the non-excluded ground but also all
veins which have their apexes within the area which was
specifically excluded. It is submitted that no such conveyance was intended as such interpretation vested in
the patentee greater rights than the statute permitted.
Under the doctrine of Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v.
Boston & M. Consol. Copper and Silver Min. Co. (20
Mont. 336; 51 Pac. 159) and State v. District Court (25
Mont. 504, 572; 65 Pac. 1020) cited at pages 74-78 of
the opening brief of Defendants and Appellants, the
grant of all veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes
of which lie inside of such excluded ground would be void.
The construction and interpretation of the definitive
description asserted by Defendants and Appellants reconciles completely with the provisions of the granting
7
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clause. In this light, the granting clause confirmed
Jones' extralateral rights in and to all veins which had
their tops or apexes within the non-excluded ground but
in order to prevent any ambiguity arising as to the extent
of the grant the draftsman took the precaution of excluding all that portion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode and of all
veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes of which lie
inside such excluded ground. The excluded ground was
Lot 48 and the conflict area except Tract A.
I t should be noted that the part of the definitive description above set forth in column parallel to the granting clause consists of two parts as follows: (a) the portion of Cora No. 1 vein or lode which lies inside of the
excluded ground; and (b) all veins, lodes and ledges
the tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded
ground.
If the construction of the definitive description advocated by Plaintiffs and Appellees is adopted the results
are also incongruous. By this interpretation the portion
of the Cora No. 1 vein or lode which lies inside of the excluded ground and also all veins, lodes and ledges the
tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground
were patented to Jones. The two constituent elements
of the grant are coupled together in the definitive description. As has been demonstrated above the conveyance
of all veins, lodes and ledges the tops or apexes of which
lie inside the excluded ground is in opposition to KS
2322 (U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 26). According to Defendants' and Appellants' contention the same is void. In
8
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interpreting the definitive description it is impossible
to separate this void grant from the grant covering the
portion of Cora No. 1 vein which lies inside of the excluded ground. (Cf. Browne vs. Weave, 348 Mo. 135, 152
S.W. (2d) 649,136 A.L.K. 286, 295).
The construction supported by Plaintiffs and Appellees requires the void element to be ignored. It is submitted that such method of interpretation violates established rules of construction. It was certainly not the
intention of the draftsman to convey veins, lodes and
ledges the tops or apexes of which lie inside of the excluded ground when such grant would be in derogation of the statute and since the portion of the clause
referring to Cora No. 1 vein or lode is coupled with
reference to the veins, lodes or ledges the tops or apexes
of which lie inside of the excluded ground it is impossible
to believe that a grant was intended by the definitive
description. Eather this situation points to the validity
of the interpretation of Defendants and Appellants which
is that the definitive description is an exclusion and not a
grant.
3. The Area Computation of the Patent Must
Be Considered.
Eeference is made to the plat inserted in the opening
brief of Defendants' and Appellants' wherein are shown
the areas described in the Jones patent. For convenience
there is here repeated the tabulation as to the acreage
described in the patent:
9
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.,

Cora No. 1 Lode-Total Area
as Located
Less Conflict with Lot
No. 48, Little Allie Lode 5.002 Acres
Less Conflict with Armstrong Placer
1.571 Acres
Total Conflict

16.157 acres

6.573 Acres

Balance
Plus Area of Tract "A"
Total Area of Cora No. 1
Amended Lode Patent

9.584 Acres
0.141 Acres

9.725 Acres

This computation makes obvious that the conflict
area (except Tract A) was excluded.
Defendants and Appellants take cognizance of the
argument of Plaintiffs and Appellees to destroy the effect
of this situation. In commenting on Point V of Defendants' and Appellants' opening brief counsel for Plaintiffs and Appellees declare:
"In Point V appellants ignore the controlling
fact that we are here concerned with a lode claim
within a prior placer." (Page 39 Plaintiffs' and
Appellees' brief.)
I t is manifest that Plaintiffs and Appellees recognize
that the Jones patent excluded the conflict area (except
Tract A) but assert that thp exclusion pertains to surface
rights only and not to the portion of the Cora No. 1 lode
within the conflict area (except Tract A). They assert
that because of the operation of R.S. 2333 (U.S.C.A. Title
10
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30 Sec. 37) Jones received title to the surface of Tract
A (being a fifty foot strip) and all of the Cora No. 1 lode
within the conflict area and that their position is supported by the decision in ML Rosa Mining, Milling and
Land Company v. Palmer, 26 Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176. It
is declared in their brief that the Mt. Eosa case "continues to be the only decision by a court of last resort
upon the precise point here involved, * * *"
There is a sharp distinction between the facts in the
Mt. Rosa case and the case at bar. In the Mt. Rosa case
Mt. Eosa Company owned a patented placer claim within
which were known lodes at the time of application for
patent for the placer. The application failed to mention
these lodes or apply for patent to same. Under the
statute the applicant in the Mt. Rosa case therefore declared that it had no right of possession to these known
veins or lodes (E.S. 2333). In the instant case there was
knowledge by the applicants for the Armstrong placer
patent of the existence of the lode called the "Armstrong
Iron Mine" but they failed to describe the part of the
lode within the conflict area. They, therefore, also declared that they had no right of possession of that part
of the lode within the conflict area. So far, the facts
of the Mt. Rosa case and the instant case parallel.
In the Mt. Rosa case Palmer's grantors on March
IS and April 5, 1892 entered upon land included within
the exterior boundaries of the Mt. Eosa placer and located the two lode claims therein. On November 7, 1892,
the Mt. Eosa Company made application for the Mt.
11
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Rosa placer claim, making no mention of the lode claims,
and on April 24, 1893, the patent therefor issued. The
ground described in said lode mining claims was excepted
out of the land described in and conveyed by the placer
patent. At the time of trial the lode claims had not been
patented. In the instant case Walker and Blair received
their patent to the Armstrong placer on December 16,
1879, which patent included the part of the Armstrong
Iron Mine as therein specifically described, which description excluded the part thereof in the conflict area, On
August 26, 1912, Jones became the owner of Cora No. 1
mining claim under patent of that date. In the instant
case, therefore, the lode claimant had received a patent
specifically describing his grant and it is this Jones
patent which controls the present situation. In the Mt.
Rosa case the lode claimant had received no patent and
the case was, therefore, decided upon the basis of the
Mt. Eosa placer patent (which specifically excluded the
lode claims) and the grantee of the locators of the
unpatented lode claims. There did not intervene in that
case a patent to the lode claims which defined the rights
of the lode claimants. In the instant case there is the
Jones patent which definitely sets forth the extent of
the grant to Jones. The terms of the Jones patent cuts
across the factual field and distinguishes the instant
case from the Mt. Rosa case, and makes the rule of that
decision inapplicable to the instant case. The Land
Department of the Federal Government by the issuance
of the Jones patent conclusively and particularly defined
the land and mineral rights conveyed. It possessed
12
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full authority to specify in the patent the rights of Jones
under the patent and this it did by process of grants
and exclusions. I t finally concluded by describing the
area patented to Jones as 9.725 acres which corresponds
with the Cora No. 1 amended application for patent
after the excluded areas are subtracted. This fact bears
heavily upon the construction and interpretation of the
patent. It can be rightfully asked, why the patent declares the area conveyed to be 9.725 acres if the mineral
deposit within the conflict area was included in the
grant?
The definitive description contains the concluding
phrase, "the premises hereby granted, containing 9.775
acres, more or less." The mineral deposit in the conflict
area consisted of 1.430 acres after excluding the area of
Tract A of 0.141 acres. As shown above, the figure of
9.775 acres does not include these 1.430 acres, although
it does include the area of Tract A. There is also
included in the total of 9.775 acres the acreage of Cora
No. 1 claim situate in the Northwest quarter of the
Southwest quarter of Section 32, which embraces both
surface and sub-surface rights. It is the "premises hereby granted" which contains a total acreage of 9.775
acres; not the surface area only. According to the interpretation of Plaintiffs and Appellees, the part of the
mineral deposit in the conflict area consisting of 1.430
acres was also part of the "premises hereby granted,"
but the computation of the acreage as recited in the
patent does not include this area of 1.430 acres. These
13
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facts show that the draftsman, in formulating the definitive description, had definitely in mind the idea that
both the surface and sub-surface rights or ownership
in the conflict area (except Tract A) were excluded and
not included in the grant.
II.
THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT JUSTHEIM IS THE SOLE OWNER OF THE LUCKY
CLAIMS. GORLINSKI HAS NO I N T E R E S T
THEREIN.
Justheim located the Lucky claims within the conflict
area. The notices of location are in his name alone.
(Defendants' Exhibits 6, 7 and 8, R. 225) Gorlinski
was employed by Justheim as an engineer to make the
locations. (R. 261) There is not a line of evidence in
this case which controverts Gorlinski's testimony in this
respect. As further proof of this fact, attention is invited
to the cross-complaint of Justheim against the Plaintiffs
and Appellees wherein he seeks to quiet title to the Lucky
claims. In this cross-complaint he asserted sole ownership in and to the claims. If he had been successful in
the lower court, the judgment would have resulted in
quieting title in Justheim (not Justheim and Gorlinski)
in and to the claims against the Plaintiffs and Appellees.
Plaintiffs and Appellees have devoted several pages
of their brief to demonstrate that the location of the
Lucky claims by Justheim is void under the theory that
Gorlinski has an interest therein. The record proves
that Justheim alone is the owner of the claims and that
14
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Gorlinski was only an employee of Justheim. The status
of the "conflict area" was not a secret held by Gorlinski
alone which he revealed to Justheim, but is a situation
clearly shown by the public land records. Anyone interested could have easily discovered the facts by an inspection of these records. Gorlinski revealed to Justheim
no professional secrets nor violated any confidence by
taking employment under Justheim. It requires much
imagination to discover any confidential relationship
between Gorlinski and the plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Company. The employment of Gorlinski by the
predecessor in title to said plaintiff had long ago ceased.
The fact that he possessed the same information concerning the conflict area as revealed by the public records did
not deny him the right to accept Justheim's employment.
It is submitted that if the Lucky locations are otherwise
valid, the fact that Gorlinski did the survey work in
connection with the same does not invalidate them.
Gorlinski did not create this condition, nor did any
information he possessed invest him with an interest or
ownership in the claims. Gorlinski's relationship with
the location of the claim is an immaterial matter in this
case.
III.
JUSTHEIM WAS AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO
ENTER UPON THE CONFLICT AREA TO MAKE
THE LUCKY LOCATIONS.
Eeference is made to the discussion of the Mt. Rosa
case, supra, by Defendants and Appellants in their opening brief (pages 103-113). It is unnecessary to repeat
15
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what was there said. I t should be carefully noted that
the facts of the instant case bring it squarely within the
doctrine of the Mt. Rosa case with respect to the question
as to whether Justheim had a right to enter upon the
Armstrong Placer in order to make his locations. If
the Jones patent excluded the conflict area in so far as
the mineral deposit is concerned, then that area was open
public domain and under the doctrine in the Mt. Rosa
case, Justheim was authorized to make his locations
within the area of the Armstrong Placer.
Defendants and Appellants affirm the statement
made at pages 110 and 111 of their opening brief:
"The evidence is clear and undisputed that
the existence of the Armstrong 'Iron Mine' was
well known at the time application for patent to
the Armstrong Placer was made; otherwise the
application would not have included a description
of part of the iron mine and the patent to Walker
and Blair would have made no reference to it.
The mineral deposit manifestly was a well-known,
notorious geological fact prior to the application
of the Armstrong placer patent and prior to the
issuance of the patent. The patent itself proves
that the deposit existed and knowledge of its
existence must be imputed conclusively to the
patentees. They elected to secure title to a part
of this deposit but failed to secure title to that
p a r t of it within the 'conflict area,' Neither the
patentees nor their successors in title are in a
position to contend that that part of the mineral
deposit within the 'conflict area' was unknown
to the patentees."
16
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It is manifest that the final determination of this
case turns upon the construction and interpretation of
the Jones patent. If the construction urged by Defendants and Appellants is correct, then that part of the
mineral deposit within the conflict area was open public
domain, subject to location, and under the rule laid down
in the Mt. Rosa decision Justheim was not a trespasser
in entering upon the Armstrong Placer to make his Lucky
locations.
WHEREFORE, Defendants and Appellants reaffirm
the prayers of their opening brief and Defendant and
Appellant Justheim submits that the District Court
should be directed to make, enter and file its judgment
quieting title in and to the Lucky claims in him.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER,
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants,
Suite 312 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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